IRAQ'S FUTURE: Sovereignty or 'sovereignty'

The recently signed interim constitution is really designed to make sure the upper hand is stamped "U.S."

by Carolyn Eisenberg

The Bush administration's commitment to restore sovereignty to the Iraqi people on June 30 is as illusory as Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction.

In what Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld buoyantly described on March 12 as "an historic moment in history, one that shows the power of freedom," the 25-member Iraqi Governing Council four days earlier signed an "interim constitution" for the period following the proposed transfer of power.

Yet this "Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period" is a deceptive document designed to obscure continued U.S. control.

It sets forth elaborate arrangements for a "transitional government" that will come into effect some time after Dec. 31, but specifies neither a structure nor a method of selection for the Iraqi body that will supposedly exercise "full sovereignty" after June 30.

These critical items are relegated to "a process of deliberations and consultations" conducted by the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority and the existing Iraqi Governing Council.

Bush officials are plainly hoping that sometime between now and June 30, United Nations negotiators will prevail upon the Iraqi principals, notably the balky Shia, to create an expanded version of the Governing Council. Even if they succeed, skeptics may properly wonder how this "sovereign" government differs from the current un-sovereign entity.

The answer is probably very little. However, by declaring the occupation over and turning the CPA into an outsized American embassy, George W. Bush can claim that Iraq is on the road to "democracy." For proof, he can continue to cite the interim constitution with its impressive list in "Chapter Two — Fundamental Rights."

Yet there is nothing democratic about the process by which the Law of Administration was developed. It was drafted by a small group of American-appointed Iraqi officials, deliberating in secret under CPA direction. The Iraqi people will have no opportunity to ratify it and cannot even enact amendments until a later stage.

Meanwhile, the document legitimates the continued presence of foreign troops in Iraq by saying "the Iraqi Armed Forces will be a principal partner in the multi-national force operating in Iraq under unified command . . ." This is of vital concern to the inhabitants, who were not consulted. Nor are these foreign troops obligated to respect the Fundamental Rights.

Beneath these machinations lies a fundamental dilemma for the Bush administration. While desiring the appearance of democracy for domestic and international purposes, it is afraid to surrender authority. Its problem is that a free Iraq is unlikely to implement the U.S. agenda: a secular state, permanent military bases, American direction of the oil industry, a privatized economy and a foreign policy consonant with Washington's.

In designing their mission for Iraq, Bush officials hoped to re-enact the successes of the early Cold War. A reconstructed West Germany helped consolidate Western Europe into a bastion of democratic capitalism and U.S. power. They envisioned a reformed, malleable post-Saddam Hussein government that could spark a similar transformation of the Middle East. But, unlike Iraq, Germany had a tradition of parliamentary governance, an established capitalist class and a strong national identity.

Moreover, Germany had first declared war on the United States, not the other way around. And the American occupiers possessed the authority that came from fighting and defeating an enemy, which had actually surrendered and disarmed. By contrast, Secretary Rumsfeld's strategy of racing to Baghdad bypassed tens of thousands of enemy troops, who retained their weapons and remained dangerous.

The result has been a disastrous occupation in which security remains an agonizing problem. The administration's current inability to arrange a viable political transition is but the most recent illustration of its foolishness in launching an invasion in the first place. Had the president and his inner circle welcomed advice, their own Middle East experts could have warned them that there was no German option for Iraq.

With luck, the Bush team may patch together another formula for keeping its handpicked Iraqi leaders in power for a few more months. But it will face a tough choice: to allow the Iraqis to determine their own leadership and pattern of governance or keep an expanded cohort of American soldiers fighting and dying in Iraq for years to come. So far, American troops have not had to face the combined wrath of the Sunnis and the Shia. It would be tragic if they did.

Carolyn Eisenberg is a professor of U.S. foreign policy at Hofstra University. This article originally appeared as an editorial in Newsday on April 1, 2004.